Since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, Saudi Arabia has not merely refrained from joining the normalization track; it has launched a coordinated political and rhetorical campaign against Arab states that chose this path, presenting itself as a “guardian of principles” and the exclusive defender of the Palestinian cause. This campaign was less about defending Palestine than about attempting to delegitimize the sovereign choices of other states and discredit any peace process not under direct Saudi control.
Saudi rhetoric toward the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco was neither neutral nor accommodating of differing approaches. Instead, it adopted a tone of moral condemnation, insinuating that normalization constituted a “betrayal” and a “departure from Arab consensus.” In international forums, and through indirect statements by officials as well as official and semi-official media, these states were portrayed as having abandoned the Palestinians, while Saudi Arabia cast itself as the last moral stronghold. The irony is that this rhetoric was not accompanied by any tangible Saudi action in favor of the Palestinians; it was confined to attacking those who attempted to change the rules of the game.
One of the clearest examples of this behavior was Saudi Arabia’s response to the UAE. While Abu Dhabi promoted normalization as a means to halt Israel’s annexation plans and open channels of pressure and influence, Riyadh treated the move as a deviation from “fundamental principles,” without offering any realistic alternative. No new Saudi peace initiative was launched, no pressure tools were activated; instead, political and media skepticism was deployed to undermine the legitimacy of normalization, in a clear attempt to strip it of any Arab legitimacy.
The same approach applied to Bahrain and Morocco. In Bahrain’s case, Saudi Arabia ignored the specificity of Manama’s decision and its security calculations, allowing religious and media rhetoric to escalate against Bahrain’s choice, as if normalization were treason rather than a sovereign decision. In Morocco’s case, the political gains achieved by Rabat were downplayed, with exclusive focus placed on accusing it of abandoning Palestine, without acknowledging that decades of Arab stagnation had delivered nothing to Palestinians but further expansion.
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This campaign was not spontaneous; it stemmed from clear Saudi anxiety. The Abraham Accords broke Riyadh’s monopoly over the Arab–Israeli conflict file. For decades, Saudi Arabia had used the Palestinian issue as a central card to amplify its regional role in Washington and Western capitals. The entry of other Arab states into direct peace processes with Israel—without passing through the Saudi gate—posed a threat to this role, prompting an aggressive response rather than a political initiative.
More troubling is that, in its attack on states that chose the path of peace, Saudi Arabia used the Palestinians themselves as an instrument of accusation. The slogan “no normalization without a Palestinian state” was raised not to pressure Israel, but to attack other Arab states. No sanctions were imposed on Tel Aviv, the oil weapon was not used, and Saudi relations with Western states were not tied to any tangible progress for Palestinians. All pressure was directed at Arabs, not at Israel. Here the paradox becomes clear: Riyadh is harsh toward Arabs and lenient toward Tel Aviv.
Saudi hardline rhetoric against the Abraham Accords has produced a sharp Arab divide. Instead of building a collective position that combined conditional normalization with pressure tools, Riyadh chose a policy of implicit denunciation. This approach not only weakened prospects for peace, but also provided Israel with an ideal pretext to claim that the problem lies not in expansionism, but in Arab division. Thus, the Saudi campaign became a free service to the occupation—whether intentionally or not.
As a result, Saudi Arabia remained entrenched in rejection without offering a realistic and practical alternative capable of advancing the peace and stability the region so desperately needs at this critical stage. No peace was achieved, no rights were gained, and no Palestinian state drew closer. What did materialize instead was an escalation of hardline rhetoric that entrenched stagnation, widened the trust gap, and further marginalized the Palestinian issue from the regional and international agenda.
In the final analysis, the Saudi attack on states party to the Abraham Accords was not a defense of Palestine, but a defense of role and influence. The Palestinian cause was used as a political weapon against Arabs, not as a pressure tool against Israel. While other states attempted to explore new paths—whether they succeed or fail—Saudi Arabia chose to condemn the experiment rather than compete with a better initiative. Thus, the discourse of “principles” became an instrument of obstruction, and Palestine was reduced from a central cause to a pretext for attack, at a moment when what was truly needed was a policy that moves closer to peace, not rhetoric that postpones it indefinitely.
